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Queen Elizabeth’s Leadership Abroad: The Netherlands in the 1570s
In 1576, after Edmund Grindal, archbishop of Canterbury, presumed to lecture Queen
Elizabeth on the importance of preaching and on her duty to listen to such lectures, his influence
diminished precipitously, and leadership of the established English church fell to Bishop Aylmer.
Grindal’s friends on the queen’s Privy Council, “forward” Calvinists (or ultra-Protestants), were
powerless to save him from the consequences of his indiscretion, which damaged the ultras’
other initiatives’ chances of success. This paper concerns one of those initiatives. From the late
1560s, they urged their queen “actively” to intervene in the Dutch wars. They collaborated with
Calvinists on the Continent who befriended Prince William of Orange and who hoped to help
him hold together a coalition of religiously reformed and Roman Catholic insurgents in the
seventeen provinces of the Low Countries. The English ultra-Protestants would have their
government send money, munitions, and men in arms to the Netherlands, to tip the balance
against viceroys sent by King Philip II of Spain. Grindal’s setback undermined the English
Calvinists’ efforts to form an Anglo-Dutch alliance which, they assumed, would boost the
prospects for an international Protestant league. 1 Yet Elizabeth did assist the Dutch as they
wrestled with decisions forced on them by developments in the Netherlands during the 1570s,
and she did so more consistently and more cleverly than many historians of Tudor diplomacy
have thought.
Two competing assessments determine the way questions are formulated in the study of
the queen’s and regime’s Dutch diplomacy. The general consensus is that she was indecisive and
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inconsistent. Paul Hammer characterizes Elizabeth’s responses to the crises in the Low Countries
as a “zigzag of different” (“even contradictory”) maneuvers. Wallace McCaffrey and R. B.
Wernham agree that England’s “hesitations and gyrations” do not pass as coherent, creditable
policy. Charles Wilson scolds Elizabeth for being timid and tepid--incapable of enthusiasm for
“a great cause.” But David J.B. Trim’s striking counterthrust depicts the queen’s overtures to
Netherlanders as part of her courageous--and “confessionally driven”--foreign policy; Trim
replaces “hesitation” and “zigzag” with a coherent “Protestant programme of action prioritized
by the Elizabethan government” with the aim of improving prospects for “Calvinist
internationalism.” 2
What follows is an alternative to all these characterizations, one that, as noted, finds
evidence for greater consistency and coherence in Elizabeth’s leadership and less confessional
“drive.” That she would have been uneasy around religious extremists ought not to astonish us;
her father’s, step-brother’s, and step-sister’s reigns as well as the start of her own were disturbed
by zealous subjects, who were bent on shoring up or dismantling the realm’s religious
settlements.
-------------------------------------------------Conflict and Coalitions
During the 1570s, King Philip’s ambitions to keep the Netherlands Catholic and to win
England back for Rome coupled the fate of the Dutch rebellion with that of Queen Elizabeth’s
regime. Philip had married Elizabeth’s half-sister and predecessor Mary Tudor in 1554 and had
lived in their realm for thirteen months, but he was occupied elsewhere when she died in 1558.
He never returned to his wife’s realm. When Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, sought refuge there
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and seemed a plausible, Catholic candidate to succeed Elizabeth, Philip’s envoys conspired to
improve her chances. But Spain had more pressing business on the Continent in the 1560s and
thereafter.
For Dutch dissidents opposed King Philip’s proposals to increase the number and
decrease the size of dioceses. The reorganization would have cost influential abbots healthy
portions of their endowments and would have diminished the Dutch nobility’s considerable
influence over local churches. The protests of those likely losers led to the recall of Antoine
Perrenot de Granvelle, the Low Countries’ leading prelate (and principal architect and advocate
of the plan). Yet dissidents’ demands escalated. They prevailed upon Philip’s regent, Margaret of
Parma, to suspend all decrees against heresy, but the religiously reformed preachers--forced from
pulpits into nearby fields--in retaliation, incited their “sheep” to sack Catholic churches. Still, the
fear that King Philip meant to export the Spanish Inquisition to the Netherlands and that Spanish
sovereignty would trump traditional Dutch liberties prompted many Calvinists and Catholics to
make common cause. Margaret urged Philip to come and ease tensions; he had toured the Low
Countries more than a decade before and had been well received. But the king sensed that the
crisis called for more than royal processions and receptions. So, in 1567, he dispatched Don
Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alba, who quickly earned a reputation for ruthlessness. 3
Prince William of Orange and his brother, Louis of Nassau, rallied the resistance, but
Alba’s feints and dodges denied the rebels anything remotely resembling the decisive victory
that could have inspired widespread Dutch and foreign support for the insurrection. William’s
initiative was frustrated at nearly every turn and has been called a military and public relations
“fiasco.” 4 By contrast, rebel mariners had significant successes at sea. Elizabeth permitted them
(“pyrates,” according to Alba; “sea beggars” to their friends) to resupply in several of her realm’s
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ports. The Dutch mariners were, in effect, her allies “off the books” in England’s unofficial trade
war with Philip. Spain, of course, complained. Repeatedly, into the early 1570s, Alba’s agents in
England urged the queen to demilitarize her coast. Early in 1572, she complied. 5
Alba got what he wanted but not what he expected. The deported “pirates” descended on
the Dutch coast, capturing Brielle weeks after the English sent them packing. They took several
cities in quick succession and gave the insurgency what historian Peter Arnade calls its “second
wind.” 6 Historians concur but disagree about England’s and Elizabeth’s part in the rebels’
resurgence. That the queen first defied Alba then acquiesced and finally had the sea beggars cast
off could illustrate what her modern critics call “hesitations and gyrations,” although Olaf Mörke
plausibly contends that Elizabeth’s responses to Alba were calculated to wage “a cold war”--but
to keep it from coming to a boil. 7
A small English expeditionary force was sent to Flushing two months after Elizabeth
evicted the Dutch mariners in 1572. Her move looks to have been a modest measure to protect
her realm’s commerce with Antwerp--from the French as much as from Alba--rather than a bold
strike to ensure the beggars’ conquest and command of the coast. The rebels’ partisans hoped to
have a larger English presence, but they were disappointed. 8 Alba weathered consecutive months
of misfortune after Brielle fell to the rebels. He held important cities in Zeeland, yet his soldiers
there and elsewhere had no pay for long periods. Word reached England that his garrisons were
“in gret penurye.” King Philip recalled him in 1573 and appointed Luis de Requesens to succeed
him. 9 Yet Spain’s military offensives during the next several years were generally unproductive.
Prince William’s position improved. Swatches of rebels acknowledged him as supreme
commander. He and his agents were authorized by delegates to the Estates General to negotiate
for foreign aid. But obstacles seemed insurmountable. How could he impress prospective allies
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with the insurgency’s chances when so much of the Netherlands remained in his enemy’s hands?
In 1575, guests invited to his wedding were warned they would find travel to the ceremonies
treacherous. 10
What may have most vexed Prince William, however, was the anxiety among Catholic
insurgents, who were unsure of his ability to control Calvinist extremists, dispossessed by Alba
in the late 1560s and ready for revenge in the early 1570s. Catholics frequently fled the regions
rebels overran, and Catholic malcontents in the rebel ranks looked beyond William. From their
perspective, it was best to “break [his] monopoly.” 11 In 1577, they invited Archduke Matthias,
twenty-year-old son of Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, to become governor-general.
William did not seem to object; instead, he mentored and almost immediately mastered the
inexperienced youth, but--with that maneuver--we have stepped into the first months of 1578,
well ahead of our story, and we should acknowledge that, both before and after the archduke’s
arrival, Prince William labored to reduce the tensions between Dutch Calvinist insurgents and
Dutch Catholics who served with or supported them. He promoted religious tolerance. The
Pacification of Ghent, signed in 1576, in the aftermath of a Spanish mutiny that torched parts of
Antwerp, proscribed persecution of the religiously reformed. Efforts to that end, however, failed.
Calvinist worship was disallowed or disrupted in provinces other than Holland and Zeeland, and
Catholics in those two provinces had reason to fear the consequences when they practiced their
religion publicly. Enduring antagonisms wrecked nearly every experiment with religious
pluralism. 12
Frances Yates, presuming Elizabeth’s indulgence, suggested that the queen approved
wholeheartedly of such experiments. She did, after all, declare her concern for the safety of
French Calvinists. 13 Yet, in 1570, she also confided that any Valois resolve to leave them in
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peace was not at all “agreeable with [her] action and proceedings against [her] subjects [who]
lately sought . . . the libertie to use the Roman religion.” 14 William was wise, therefore, not to
urge his scheme on the queen. Her agent William Davison reported that the prince hoped she
would have a “tender regard” for all her subjects but that he came no closer to criticism of
intolerance in England. 15 Orange’s letters to Elizabeth and to the ultra-Protestant interventionists
in her realm rarely commented on confessional interests. Dutch appeals for English aid were not
faith-based. They underscored the military rather than the religious predicaments that Elizabeth’s
subjects would face if her government failed the prince and his partisans. England, William said,
was “voyd of stronghouldes to staye [an] enemy any whyle,” so--being “neighbored” by Spain to
the southwest, it could ill afford having Philip’s regents in the Netherlands establish an arsenal to
its east. 16
Orange’s arguments for more abundant and conspicuous English support for the Dutch
insurgency were less effective stirring the queen’s regime than was Philip’s appointment of an
ambitious new regent after Requesens’s death in 1576. Don John of Austria was known for his
military prowess and militant Catholicism. Whereas Alba, when he had commanded the Spanish
troops in the Netherlands, thought the conquest of England unworkable, Don John considered the
invasion of England an obvious sequel to his pacification of the Netherlands. He planned to cross
the Channel, storm ashore, depose Elizabeth, and marry Mary Stuart, disclosing his plans to the
Queen of Scots’s partisans in France, who were said to be receptive to his requests for help. 17
Bishop Richard Curteys of Chichester told Elizabeth’s Council that Catholics in his
diocese grew “worse and worse,” referring, it seems, to their insolence, as rumors about Don
John’s imminent invasion reached them. 18 Perhaps to prevent his celebrity from deflating the
queen’s confidence in Prince William’s abilities, the realm’s ultra-Protestants expressed fresh
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confidence in his resourcefulness. Yet, as their sovereign’s eyes, ears, and advisers, they were
also obliged to report challenges that appeared to overtax his gifts and resources: he could not
keep Calvinist troops from misbehaving while defending predominantly Catholic regions, and
his strategies for reconciling disaffected Catholic rebels and Calvinist extremists and for forging
a united front against Spain were ultimately undermined by the “particularism” that plagued the
seventeen provinces, especially as regional resentments were exacerbated by confessional
commitments. 19 Despite his efforts, the latter were turning the insurrection into a series of civil
wars. 20 One pamphleteer portrayed Prince William as a Dutch Brutus, admirably bent on
contesting Caesar’s (King Philip’s) right to reign yet finally and woefully incapable of achieving
a consensus among those Catholics, Calvinists, Gelderlanders, Ghentois, and others, whose
reciprocal antipathies gave Spain reasons to believe that its commanders could ultimately divide
and reconquer. 21 The English government, informed of all this, was unlikely to think that
William was flirting with success. Francis Walsingham’s copybook mentions that “dissensions
in the [Low] Countries” vexed delegates to the Estates General, trying to collect revenues for
collective defense--“dissensions” that resulted in defections. 22
Defections were common after Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, joined forces with
Don John and after Spain’s decisive win at a battle near the village of Gembloux in early 1578.
Most rebel casualties were Catholics, but, as Rolf Bremmer suspects, Gembloux was “a heavy
blow” for all insurgents to absorb (een geduchte klap). 23 Setbacks followed: Gravelines soon
capitulated to Don John; Parma took Maastricht. The year 1578 would be critical for William
and Elizabeth.
---------------------------------------
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1578
Prince William worked overtime to avoid his coalition’s collapse. He appealed to France
for assistance. He courted François Hercule d’Valois, duke of Anjou, King Henry III’s younger
brother. As early as 1575, rumors circulated in Spain that Anjou was eager to lead an army of
French Calvinists into the Netherlands to fight alongside the Dutch rebels. 24 He seemed just as
eager in 1578, notwithstanding the efforts of his brother and redoubtable mother, Catherine de
Medici, to dissuade him. 25 At that later date, Anjou was no longer friendly with the religiously
reformed in France, so he led a largely Catholic force into the Low Countries. For their part, the
English ultra-Protestants were livid. Walsingham had been in Paris in 1572, during the massacre
of Calvinists there, and mistrusted the “underhanded” French, although he and his queen had no
choice but to accept their intervention. Prince William was resolved; still, Walsingham weighed
in, warning the Dutch, early in 1578, against indulging the duke. And even after Elizabeth had
warmed to Orange’s and the Estate General’s new Valois ally, Walsingham expressed grave
reservations about Angevin involvement. 26
At first, Elizabeth had been as anxious as Walsingham remained. She insisted that only
an imperceptive statesman could have missed the obvious, namely, that English support for the
insurgency, from 1570, had been proffered to keep the French away. 27 William was aware of the
“obvious” yet complained that English support fell far short of Dutch expectations, implying that
the consequences of the shortfall--Parma’s and Don John’s conquests during the first few months
of 1578--should have alarmed the queen and her Council, inasmuch as the insurgents and Estates
General, as a result, “standeth on . . . terms of extremitie.” William conceded that inviting Anjou
was risky, but, he continued, no good alternative presented itself. 28
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Elizabeth supplied an alternative. She sent and subsidized a surrogate, John Casimir, son
of the Elector Palatine. William apparently welcomed him, if only to have Calvinist Casimir, as a
counterweight to balance Catholic Anjou and presumably to improve the prospects for a
confessionally bipartisan rebel front. But neither duke--Casimir nor Anjou--proved able to
control what James Tracy describes as the “ill paid and ill-disciplined troops” each brought with
him. 29 Casimir caused additional difficulties for Prince William (and Elizabeth) by encouraging
religiously reformed extremists whose “greate instancy” or impetuosity, the queen was told, had
incensed Catholics and moderates in Ghent. 30 Ghentois moderates blamed England; Ambassador
William Davison relayed that news late in 1578, yet, by then, without allowing that the fault was
hers, Elizabeth had reevaluated her collaboration with Casimir. As we learned, she changed her
mind about Anjou’s initiatives--and about Anjou. The English ultra-Protestants learned to their
dismay that French emissaries would soon be at their queen’s Court “to break ageyn into the
matter of mariadg.” 31
English ultra-Protestants believed their queen’s “cold dealing” with the Dutch rebels was
responsible for Prince William’s partnership with Anjou. 32 And many English Calvinists would
have been delighted with the ostensible thaw, had Elizabeth not opened pre-nuptial negotiations.
She must have known that news of her revived interest in the Anjou match would distress many
religiously reformed subjects, even though any surviving offspring of that match would have
excluded the Catholic Queen of Scots from the succession. Yet Elizabeth had no wish to sift
matrimonially-related pros and cons with her Council. During the summer of 1578, traveling
through Suffolk and Norfolk, she kept Leicester at arm’s length. Historian Patrick Collinson is
certain that “never before or after, in the correspondence among themselves” did Leicester and
Walsingham “do less to disguise the fact that they had the greatest difficulty in inclining their
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queen to their way of thinking.” 33 Walsingham, who was abroad at the time, was cautioned to
keep his displeasure under wraps. 34 So, with little prompting from her subjects who displayed
greatest interest in international Protestantism, their queen determined that her realm’s safety
depended on Dutch rebels’ abilities to preoccupy the Spanish, which, in turn, depended on
Anjou’s participation in their insurrection. And she seems also to have decided that flirting with
the duke--perhaps marrying him, if it came to that--looked to be a last brass, if the scales needed
tipping to that end. 35
Or was it love? Was Elizabeth as seriously smitten as Ilona Bell suggests? Bell finds the
queen’s letters to Anjou “heavy with the language of love” A sonnet “On Monsieur’s Departure”
that Bell attributes to Elizabeth casts the narrator as a second Dido. 36 Yet we cannot be confident
that the queen had a hand in that sonnet’s composition, and the rhetoric of the letters, which may
have been literary exercises, seems too slender a thread to support the idea that the usually
strategic, spinster queen was pining for a duke, twenty years her junior. But this is not to
question that Elizabeth was in love with being courted. Nearly all historians writing about the
courtship’s early innings concede that she enjoyed her young suitor’s attention, and most who
attend to its late phase (from summer, 1578 to the duke’s death in 1583) mention her romance
with romance. But Bell’s slender thread is the only support for objections to the generalization
that, on matrimonial matters, Elizabeth usually led with her head, not with her heart. 37
Nor did her faith dictate her policy. She seems not to have been tempted in 1578 by the
ultra-protestants’ efforts to cobble together an international Calvinist coalition. Conceivably, she
rekindled Anjou’s interest in marriage that year to explore an alternative. Maybe the Angevin
courtship was part of an ambitious yet relatively low-cost plan to “breed pikes” in the
Netherlands, to prompt England’s enemies, France and spendthrift Spain, to battle to exhaustion
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well away from England. Those pikes and the idea surface in a letter that Nicholas Bacon, Lord
Keeper of the Great Seal, sent to Walsingham. Bacon believed that the duke’s opportunism and
arrogance could be turned to English advantage. Anjou, he guessed, would eventually refuse to
play second fiddle to Prince William, defy both the Dutch Estates General and Spain, and seize
parts of the Dutch provinces for himself. “That Spain will endure” the seizure was improbable,
yet, with Anjou “bringing [what he seized] within the governance of France,” Bacon could not
“see that the French king will suffer him to lose it.” 38
Religiously reformed polemicists continued to fret about Anjou’s religion. Had Elizabeth
been attracted to the ultra-Protestants’ dreams of an international Protestant coalition, she would
likely have fretted as well. 39 But, if I am correct, she construed the Angevin match as a possible
answer to an enduring foreign policy question: how might her realm keep a hand in the business
of war without having it lopped off. To Bacon and Elizabeth, by 1578, keeping the Netherlands
unquiet seems to have replaced other objectives that spurred the queen to offer herself as gobetween and mediator. But “breed[ing] pikes,” to some extent, was consistent with what she and
her regime had been doing during the 1570s, propping up Prince William just enough so that the
Dutch “not [be] opprest.” 40 Anjou was a prop, buttressing the Dutch, battling Spain, and, should
Bacon have his way, setting the French and Spanish at each other’s throats in the Low Countries.
--------------------------------------------------Conclusion
Elizabeth did not share English ultra-Protestants’ confidence in Prince William’s ability
to draw the Dutch Calvinists together and into an international Protestant league before, during,
or after 1578. Nor did his effort to promote religious tolerance in the Low Countries strike her as
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a compelling reason to intervene decisively. The effort looked to be doomed as long as Spanish
troops’ successes frightened Calvinists and emboldened Catholics. Could the latter have helped
perceiving Don John’s and Parma’s advances as symptoms of Catholic resurgence? How could
Dutch Calvinists have doused suspicions that their Catholic countrymen would ultimately form
fifth columns in areas controlled by the religiously reformed yet threatened by King Philip’s
commanders? Moreover, even the Catholics who opposed Spain’s regents in the Netherlands
would have seen their churches desecrated and their coreligionists serving as magistrates ousted
by Calvinist neighbors. Dutch Catholics, that is, could be excused for having thought that Prince
William’s efforts to guarantee them freedom to worship in regions under Protestant control were
ineffective if not also insincere or, as one historian speculated, sneaky (geniepige). 41 Was
William decreeing tolerance merely to buy time, to forestall confrontations in which the
numerical superiority of Netherlanders professing the old faith would tell in their favor?
What may have troubled Elizabeth more than William’s difficulties winning Dutch
Catholics’ trust was his failure to control unruly Calvinist extremists. The problem, on that
count, was structural as well personal, for Dutch Calvinism was bishop-less. And that deficit
accounted for the kind of pluriformity that the English queen believed to be treacherous. She
relied on her bishops to preserve religious uniformity. From the 1560s, the English critics of
episcopacy were relentless; the hierarchy of their established church seemed to them warmedover Catholicism. To Elizabeth, however, a bench of bishops was the mainstay of an adequately
reformed religious settlement. She resisted those critics’ efforts, from the start of her reign to its
end, to confiscate bishops’ estates and to force her mitred proprietors to live--as little more than
diocesan notaries--on petty pensions. She very likely judged the Dutch Calvinists’ discipline in
the light of her experience trying to bridle their friends in her realm who were fond of the way
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Calvinism on the Continent had developed. But neither the Swiss nor Prince William saw the
need for religiously reformed bishops. The latter apparently did not think Protestant pluriformity
was repulsive; Elizabeth did. That difference, combined with other factors discussed here, quite
possibly discouraged the English queen from heavily investing in the Dutch rebellion, That she
pilloried Archbishop Grindal, whom, as we learned at the start, ultra-Protestants supported,
might suggest as much, for he was thought to have encouraged pluriformity among the realm’s
religiously reformed. In 1576, speaking for Elizabeth and against Grindal, Nicholas Bacon
maintained that pluriformity was tantamount to “nulliformity” or anarchy. 42
Still, notwithstanding structural problems that the unsettled confessional affairs in the
Low Countries exhibited to Elizabeth and England, the queen and her Council seem determined
not to abandon William and the insurgents to the Spanish. True, English policy and practice did
not serve the rebels as well as they hoped they might during the 1570s. And landmark successes
that were later anticipated when one of the queen’s favorites, Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester,
accompanied Anjou to Antwerp (in 1582) were not forthcoming. Leicester soon left, and the
tensions between François Hercule and the Estates General, which expected to keep him on a
short leash, disappointed Prince William and drove the duke to distraction until his death the
following year. 43 William, for his part, tried to appease delegates to the Estates General. In
theory, according to J.J. Woltjer, the assembly could have well served--and have been well
served by--its field commander. In theory--as long as Orange did not pound piston-like the
delegates or the more prosperous Dutch cities with unreasonable requests--his prerogatives, the
cities’ autonomy, and the Estates’s authority ought to have been preserved, even as concessions
accommodated war-time crises and avoided political and social destabilization. But in practice,
disequilibrium prevailed. 44
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As Elizabeth and England looked on, confessional differences among the Dutch thwarted
Prince William’s attempts to build coalitions during the 1570s. The queen could not overlook the
malcontents’ complaints and recriminations to see what ultra-Protestants on her Council saw, the
makings of an international Calvinist collaborative. Nor did she share the vision often attributed
to Orange and his close associates, which surfaces in the conviction among some historians that
“a new state [was] emerg[ing]” in the late 1570s, “in coexistence, and as if in interaction, with a
complex and fiercely defended religious diversity.” 45 To the end of that decade--and probably to
William’s assassination in 1584, Elizabeth saw things differently; so she put off the Spanish,
propped up the Dutch--to a point--and kept wars from her shores.
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the 1570s, provided the motor for the revolt”; see Trim’s “Conflict, Religion, and Ideology,” in European Warfare,
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